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Distrust Quotations in Latin 
Peter Goodrich 
At the end of what she deemed to have been the worst of years, the 
English sovereign in her annual address to the nation resorted to Latin. The 
monarch, titular head of state and of the legal system, announced at the 
close of 1992 that it had been annus horribilis. In the face of tragic events 
and immediate threats, the impending divorce of her son and heir and the 
specter of taxation of the monarchy, the queen resorted paradoxically to a 
dead language, to a heavy signifier, to the weight of Latin. The force of the 
immediate and the pressure or stress of the political required the distance 
and gravitas of a language that few any longer either know or understand. 
It was the appropriate mode in which to signal both authority and grief. 
For an American audience, at the risk of a bad pun, annus horribilis 
probably translates as an asshole of a year and might well be thought to be 
a somewhat quaint example of the antique customs of the English. The ap-
parent aura of civic republicanism in the United States, however, should 
not lead too quickly to the conclusion that the pinnacle of the U.S. juridical 
system is free of such rhetorical recourse to the foreign and antique. Faced 
with a peculiarly politicized and highly charged decision in the 2000 Pres-
idential election, the U.S. Supreme Court also resorted to Latin. The much 
publicized and eagerly awaited judgment in Bush v. Gore was handed down 
quite literally to waiting journalists and other media representatives on the 
courthouse steps under the rubric of having been decided per curiam. 1 
The title is taken from Gustave Flaubert, Dictionnaire des idees refues, in Oeuvres, 2 vols. (Paris, 
1952), 2:1016, whose entry under Latin reads: "Distrust quotations in Latin: they always hide 
something dubious." For constructive criticisms-for dubiety-my thanks to Lauren Berlant, 
Rudiger Campe, Michele Lowery, John McGinnis, Linda Mills, Tim Murphy, Uriel Procaccia, 
Peter Tiersma, and especially Anton Schutz. 
I. See Bushv. Gore521 US 98 (2000). 
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The Supreme Court's recourse to what is now conventionally regarded 
as a dead language, a foreign idiom, an obscure terminology even within 
law, in fact performs the same political and rhetorical function as does the 
queen's invocation of Latin. I will argue that, far from being dead, these 
examples show that Latin has a continuing and perhaps even augmented 
role precisely by virtue of its scarcity or at least the highly limited public 
domain of its actual comprehension. The trajectory of the demise of Latin 
that is charted and reported by scholars such as Franyoise Waquet in fact 
signals the political premium that can now be placed on Latinity.2 The for-
mula can be stated as follows: the less that Latin is known and used-the 
rarer its comprehension in professional and academic circles, let alone in 
the rest of the public sphere-the more powerful and persuasive its ma-
nipulative or political effects. Latin may be misused, but it is precisely its 
misuse that marks its rhetorical force and its likely future. 
The Perennial Malaise of the Universal 
One of the last great treatises on rhetoric and the Latin tradition appeared 
in 1730 under the title Histoire des tropes, which translates either as History 
of Tropes or as History of the Tropes. 3 In the preface to the second edition of 
this work, published in 1757, du Marsais recounts how, shortly after the book 
first appeared, he happened to encounter a wealthy acquaintance who re-
marked enthusiastically that he had heard many good things said of the 
History. It became clear from what this gentleman said, however, that he 
thought that the Tropes were a tribe and that the treatise was an account of 
their origins. The error is not ludicrous. In both Latin and French trope 
( tropus) is close to tropic ( tropicus); one refers to a turning of words, the 
other to the turning of the sun. The title could well conjure an image of 
some then-distant equatorial tribe, the troprianders perhaps, or some ver-
sion of Levi-Strauss's Tristes Tropiques. The misreading is also, however, a 
2. See Fran~oise Waquet, Latin, or, the Empire of a Sign: From the Sixteenth to the Twentieth 
Centuries, trans. John Howe (London, 2001); hereafter abbreviated L. 
3. See M. du Marsais, Des Tropes, ou des diferens sens dans lesquels on peut prendre un meme mot 
dans une meme /angue ( Paris, 1757). 
PETER Goo o RI c H is professor oflaw at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law. His books include Legal Discourse: Studies in Rhetoric, Linguistics, and Legal 
Analysis (1989); Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks 
(1990 ); Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law (1995); and Law in the Courts of 
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drastic one, and it led du Marsais to truncate the title of the second edition 
of his treatise to Of Tropes. 
A lexical error of the sort that du Marsais recounts could have serious 
and avoidable consequences. Trope is not an invented term, and in the 1750s 
as much as today anyone "who has completed the ordinary course of stud-
ies" in literature or rhetoric would know its meaning.4 In law as in other 
disciplines, lexicon and grammar, the parts of speech, are assumed-pre-
supposed-in professional practice, and for most of the history of Western 
law, for close to a thousand years-indeed right up until the 197os-gram-
mar has meant Latin. Just as du Marsais responded to his friend's lack of 
lexical acumen by changing his title, so too the demise of Latin has had 
significance and an impact upon a variety of professional practices. What 
has changed between 1750 and the present day is not that Latin is less un-
derstood but that since the 1960s Latin is no longer a part of "the ordinary 
course of studies." Latin is no longer a requirement for the study of law, 
medicine, or science. The Catholic Church has also dropped Latin as the 
language of the liturgy. The second millennium is a changed era, a thor-
oughly vernacular world. Although all the disciplines are still peppered with 
dubious Latin quotations, with maxims and words from the Roman tongue, 
we now belong to what the Bishop of Bo urges once termed a Pala tin (pas-
latin) generation (see L, p. 61). 
The history of Latin is also the history of the ignorance of Latin. For 
much of the history of the West, Latin was a synonym for reason (ratio 
studiorum), for culture (latinitas), and for law (ratio scripta). To be literate 
was to be competent in Latin, and it was Latin that distinguished laity from 
literati, peasantry from nobility and gentility, the unlearned-imperiti-
from the professions. Clearly the class of those who did not know Latin was 
always much larger than that of those who had studied it and greater still 
by no mean measure, as Waquet's recent study suggests, than that of those 
who were competent to read it. Latin was the great divide; it was the mark 
of legitimacy, the harbinger of divinity, legality, and scientific truth. Latin 
gave Western metaphysics its form, and it was as such first and foremost a 
sign rather than a competence, an emblem of culture rather than an explicit 
practice of knowing. 5 The first avenue to explore in addressing the question 
4. Ibid., p. vi. 
5. For fear that it be said that I am ignoring the Greeks and the Heideggerian hypothesis that we 
are living out a Greek origin, I will add that the historical relation of Latin to Greek was, for the 
longue duree ofhellenistic Rome, broadly that of the vernacular to the Latin. Despite the 
importance of Greek, however, the European reception of the classics was a Latin reception. It was 
overwhelmingly through the Latinate framework of the Renaissance that the Greek tradition was 
recovered and reinterpreted. As for Heidegger, I am minded of James Bramston's aphorism in The 
Art of Politic/cs, in Imitation of Horace's Art of Poetry (London, 1729 ): "All Mr. Heydegger's Letters 
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of the significance of the "exhaustion" or malaise of Latin is thus political. 
What hierarchy did Latin shore up, and what liberation comes or is coming 
in the wake of its seeming desuetude? Inversely, what is lost with the decay 
of Latin as a living pedagogic form? At some point in the future will there 
be, as history suggests, another Renaissance, another humanism or a return 
to the classics? Secondly, what is the effect of the loss of Latin upon the 
discourse of the public sphere? Insofar as law represents the last instance of 
veridical discourse within the contemporary public sphere-it is at least the 
most serious form of social self-reflection-what does the decline of Latin 
mean for the validity oflaws? 
Presences 
We are surrounded by Latin, even today. Latin remains the primary lan-
guage of inscriptions on buildings; it forms the text of the written city. Thus 
the frieze of the National Archive in Washington reads: Omnia scrinia habet 
in pectore sua-the truth is stored here. The motto of virtually every uni-
versity,is Latin. Harvard's laconic Veritas is not only inscribed on all its sta-
tionery but also carved on all professorial chairs. There is the popular rerum 
cognoscere causa~to know the cause of things-that appears on the insig-
nia of numerous universities. From the juristically arrogant fiat jus, to the 
rather more appropriately hysterical motto of my preparatory school: dum 
spiro spero--while I breathe I hope (to escape this prison)-Latin rules the 
idiom of insignia, as of aphorism and epithet. In medicine, the humanities, 
and law the vocabulary of the disciplines, the terms and maxims of art, 
remain Latin. We send out our curriculum vitae, sing the Te Deum, regularly 
write nota bene and post scriptum. Even scholars who neither know any 
Latin, nor ever studied it, use Latin titles for their work and cite cases or 
aphorisms in the Latin tongue. 
Where Latin is not used, proper English usage still depends upon the 
notion that it is Latin that is being used. It is improper, some grammarians 
still intone, to split infinitives and the reason for this is simply that it was 
not done in Latin. Latin, in other words, rules. It was the language of power, 
of monarchs, and it was also the measure oflanguage, the rule against which 
signs are valued. If it is dead, it is also possible that like the forms of action 
it still governs us from the grave. It rules as proper grammatical form; it 
legitimates as superior knowledge or learning; and in the legal forms of ac-
tion it structures transactions, rights, and duties. If we get into trouble with 
the law, we know that pretty soon we will end up having to deal with Latin, 
come directed to him from abroad, A Monsieur, Monsieur Heydegger, Surintendant des Plaisirs 
d'Angleterre" (p. 7). 
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· be it seeking release by means of a writ of habeas corpus, justification 
through caveat emptor, or relief by pleading de minim is non cu rat lex (I was 
only a little in the wrong). 
The paradox of Latin, as Waquet's cultural history expounds it, is that 
from the Renaissance to the present day the power of Latin was surprisingly 
unconnected to its actual knowledge or use. The passions raised by Latin 
and the debates over its pedagogical value, its retention and its decline, were 
"out of all proportion to people's knowledge of the language" (L, p. 2). The 
most striking feature ofWaquet's research-though it is perhaps not wholly 
surprising and is certainly true of my own experience of Latin-is that the 
study of Latin was largely unconnected to comprehension of the language 
or of the purpose of studying the language. The gerund grind, as the Vic-
torian English used to refer to Latin class, took up a huge amount of time. 
In the mid nineteenth century roughly 85 percent of the teachers at Eton 
taught Latin, yet under 40 percent of the graduating students had any sound 
or working grasp of the language ( see L, p. 217). Latin class in my day started 
with Kennedy's Latin _Primer and began with the declension of mensa--
mensa, mensa, mensam, mensae, mensae, mensa: a table, o table, a table, of 
a table, to or for a table, by with or from a table, and so on. As Winston 
Churchill posed it: "'What on earth did it mean? Where was the sense in it? 
It seemed absolute rigmarole to me"' (L, p. 140 ). When, for instance, would 
one use the vocative and address or invoke "O table"? As to the endless 
classroom translations, what connection or meaning was a child supposed 
to bring to the interminable descriptions of Caesar's military maneuvers, 
to Labienus marching hither and thither across Gaul, or Fabius Maximus 
Cunctator's endless refusal to engage the Carthaginians? My most vivid 
memory of the Latin language-even though my research later brought me 
to working somewhat incompetently with Latin texts-is that of my prep 
school teacher Mr. Swinburne who would pick me up by the ear every time 
I got a declension wrong. He managed to instill fear rather than grammar, 
and boredom or terror seem to have been the principal markers of those 
who learned Latin in the modern era. 
What is less immediately obvious is that what was true of my youthful 
experience of Latin, that it had neither relevance nor meaning, was true for 
centuries of students across Europe and beyond. The discovery of the 
printing press had the effect of introducing the vernacular into the literate 
world. 6 Although Latin editions of works tended initially to sell better than 
6. Elizabeth Eisenstein makes the point that it was printing and not Protestantism that 
outmoded the medieval vulgate and equally it was printing that gave the vernacular status and 
social presence; see Elizabeth Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change ( Cambridge, 
1980), pp. 353-59. 
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their translations, printing rapidly made the classics available in the ver-
nacular. It was a principal credo of the Reformation that religious texts be 
available in the vernacular, and not without a certain irony the maxim sola 
scriptura, or the scriptures alone, governed the reformist project. The Ref-
ormation was not free of paradoxes: Henry VIII abolished the monasteries 
and prescribed Lily's Latin Grammar for the schools; Luther's catechism was 
in Latin, but it is clear that by the seventeenth century there was no prag-
matic necessity for knowledge of Latin. For almost four centuries more, 
however, it continued to be taught; it ruled in the Church, the schools, and 
the professions. Although there was no obvious need for Latin, an enor-
mous amount of school time was devoted to the dead language and to the 
utopian ideal of a universal tongue. 
Long before du Marsais was drawn up short by the linguistic ignorance 
of his public, minimal competence or perfunctory performance in Latin 
was the norm rather than the exception. Using the example of France in the 
early years of the seventeenth century, Waquet evidences that even if a small 
elite were successful Latinists, "the mass seems to have dragged itself pain-
fully along, eventually arriving after huge effort at a depressingly mediocre 
level" (L, p. 132). Antoine Arnauld, for example, contrasted the eight hours 
of Latin a day stipulated by the University of Paris with the "extreme ig-
norance" of undergraduates. At approximately the same time, the philos-
opher and rhetorician Abraham Fraunce made similar complaints about 
those who studied law at the Inns of Court at the height of the Renaissance: 
their Latin was barbarous and their method nonexistent. "Uncunning" and 
"illogical" lawyers, the "grand little mootmen" of the Inns of Court, learned 
a few Latin words and then rushed home to destroy their neighbors' pros-
perity with their ignorance. 7 The French lawyer Raymond de Varennes com-
plained later that ten years of study of Latin principles led to students 
coming home '"stuffed and bloated with unintelligible Latin and very ig-
norant of everything else"' (L, pp. 132-33). The same complaints could be 
heard regularly across Europe. Roughly 10 percent of students actually 
learned the tongue; the rest, the vast majority, simply beat their heads 
against a moribund universal. As the centuries progressed, the ratio of time 
to competence only worsened. When attempts were made to revive Latin, 
the reformers clearly admitted its ineradicable decline. The Polish Com-
mission on Education in the 1770s explicitly ruled that "'Latin, even if in-
correct, is needed for juridical matters and by men of Law."' It went on to 
allow the teaching of an "impure" Latin in the hope of keeping the language 
alive among its students (L, p. 156) . 
7. Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike (London, 1588), pp. 54-55, 89v. 
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The paradox of Latin as a universal is not simply that the language was 
archaic and underused or, even more radically, an artifice; as Rimbaud put 
it: "'Who knows if the Latins existed? Perhaps it is just some forged lan-
guage"' (L, p. 144). It was neither dead nor universal. From soon after the 
beginning of print, written Latin was inaccessible to all but a small pan-
European elite, and spoken Latin was so marked by the phonetic differences 
of different regions that even Latin scholars could not understand each 
other across the boundaries of regional dialects. For a very long. time, and 
this is Waquet's principal argument, Latin as a competence or practice of 
translation has been a specialism, an elite competence, the pursuit of a rela-
tively small minority. The paradox she poses most starkly is that Latin, a 
language without general linguistic significance, was relentlessly taught 
hour upon hour, year after year, century after century, by a method of rote 
learning that produced linguistic competence in only a small minority of 
those who suffered its interminable inscription. Teaching Latin had to be 
the sign of something else; it was a code, a secret encounter, a politics by 
other means. 
Sanctity and Latinity8 
The most general answer to the paradox of the apparent malaise of the 
universal lies in the status that Latin conferred not upon those who were 
competent in it but upon those who had studied it or could pretend to know 
it. The medieval distinction between literate and illiterate, between cleric 
and laity ( or, to use the more graphic Latin, idiota) was drawn between those 
who had studied Latin, whether or not they were competent in it, and those 
who had not. 9 In one much later well-known French formulation, "the 
ruling classes will always remain the ruling classes ... because they know 
Latin."10 That formulation now seems both prescient and inaccurate. The 
irony is that the ruling class did not know Latin, but they continued to use 
it anyway. Nietzsche perhaps captured this argument best when he ex-
claimed to his fellow philologists that one could only understand the classics 
if one had "a head for the symbolic." 11 To put it most starkly, Latin was the 
8. The English Renaissance lawyer William Fulbecke formulated this proximity well in 
claiming, in an enormously successful law textbook, that "religion and law do stand together" 
(William Fulbecke, Direction or Preparative to the Study of Law [ 1599; London, 1829] , p. 3) . 
9. Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, England 1066-1307(Cambridge, Mass., 
1993) elaborates this point in detail in the context of England after the Norman conquest. See also, 
and more broadly, Brian Stock, The Implications of Literacy (Princeton, N.J., 1983), pp. 12-15, 27-31. 
JO. Attributed to M. Dupanloup by A. Proust, Histoire de l'enseignement en France (Paris, 1968), 
pp. 131-32; quoted in L, p. 215. 
I I. "He who has no sense of the symbolic has none for antiquity" (Friedrich Nietzsche, We 
Philologists, in The Case of Wagner [Edinburgh, 1911], p. 118). 
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symbolic. As Latin disappears from the curriculum is it possible that in time 
the symbolic will collapse? The Nietzschean context of that question pro-
vides a clue to the answer: the collapse of the symbolic is a correlate of the 
death of God. Like the ambivalent and ineffective murder of that other, 
greater universal, the Christian deity, the demise of Latin is paradoxical in 
its effects. Put it like this: Nietzsche may have said "God is dead," but we 
are still talking about the divinity. Similarly, Latin may be a defunct tongue, 
but Nietzsche insisted that Latin was better than German. Latin retains and 
may indeed extend its rhetorical power in inverse proportion to any actual 
competence in the use of the language. 
For the post-Justinian tradition in the West that sought to reclaim and 
promulgate Roman law in the name of a long dead Christian Empire that 
had been overrun by the Goths, law was the speech of God. What God said 
was law, and God spoke Latin. The tradition oflaw in the West was explicitly 
a dual tradition, a tradition of canon law and civil law, of utrumque ius or 
of one law and the other. 12 Both as language and law, as grammar and what 
Bude termed the spirit of latinitas, Latin was the medium of culture, of 
political and legal power, throughout the Western world. 13 As the fifteenth-
century humanist Lorenzo Valla formulated it in Elegantiae: '"We have lost 
Rome .. . yet nevertheless, by virtue of this even more splendid power, we 
reign still over a large part of the world ... . The Roman empire is where 
the language of Rome reigns"' (L, p. 258). What reigned was not simply a 
tradition-a knowledge of antiquities or veterum sapientia-but a political 
network, a mode of staging the social, a theater of power that was lodged 
firmly in the two forms of Roman law, spiritual and temporal, those of Sa-
lem and of Bizance. 14 
Latin was the vehicle of a dual law and of the dual polity that it instituted. 
The staging of the social at the structural level of rituals and ceremonies of 
12. An obscure but nonetheless the best study of the reception of the two laws is Pierre Legendre, 
La Penetration du droit romain dans le droit canonique classique de Gratien a Innocent IV (1140--1254) 
(Paris, 1964). The essays in Legendre, Ecrits juridiques du Moyen Age occidental (London, 1988) 
provide further esoteric details and directions. Translations of some of Legendre's work are available 
in Law and the Unconscious: A Legendre Reader, trans. Peter Goodrich, Alain Pottage, and Anton 
Schutz, ed. Goodrich (New York, 1997) . I have addressed this theme in "Salem and Bizance: A 
Short History of the Two Laws," Law in the Courts of Love {London, 1996) among other places. 
13. See Guillaume Bude, De Philologia (Paris, 1536). 
14. Legendre, Le Desir politique de Dieu: Etude surles montages de l'etat et du droit {Paris, 1988), 
pp. 271-89 provides an excellent elaboration of the various forms of delegated divinity, of the 
vicarius Christi or names of the Father, from Emperor to King to Judge to Law. Such a tradition 
was not, of course, without its critics. At the very beginning of the reception of Roman law, 
Placentinus, for example, in the Sermo de legibus, inveighs against the ager vetus, the reliquary 
field, of Justinian 's law and compares the Latinate tradition unfavorably to youthful and 
vernacular forms oflaw. The Sermo is reproduced with commentary in Hermann Kantorowicz, 
"The Poetical Sermon of a Medieval Jurist: Placentinus and His Sermo de legibus," Journal of the 
Warburg Institute2 (1938) : 22-41. 
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power was modeled on a monotheistic theory of knowledge as a delegation 
from God's will. Knowledge was a spiritual truth. What was known was 
learned by dint of the knower's proximity to the divinity and so was a more 
or less accurate reflection of a singular universal or, in theological terms, an 
impossible unity, that of the conjunction of the divine and the human. Eu-
rope was spiritually and epistemologically a single empire. Where Latin 
reigned there was a single norm and a correspondingly singular hierarchy 
of governance. As the Institutes put it, the emperor was armed by force and 
by laws. 15 The Digest, the foundational grammar or Latin source ofWestern 
law, explicitly refers to Deo auctore, to God as the author of the laws and 
refers to lawyers as sacerdotes or priests of law. The study of law, in its clas-
sical definition, was explicitly a knowledge of things divine and human. 16 
These are not points to belabor here beyond observing that the link between 
the theater of the divinity, Latin, and law were explicit and of structural 
significance. Faith in God and faith in law were expressly Latin endeavors 
or, for the "vulgar" who spoke no Latin, they were secondary knowledges 
conveyed by the interpretative-though not necessarily linguistic-skills of 
priests, judges, doctors, and lawyers. Law instituted a Latinate life, it 
"nursed" and watched over the subject's soul, and it set up the space of a 
singular, God-given truth.17 
Before and after the Reformation, the defense of Latin against the ver-
nacular, against the slide towards modernity, was expressly a defense of 
Western metaphysics, of the architecture of faith. Within the Church, the 
law, medicine, and science, the language of truth was exclusively Latin. The 
hierarchy of knowledges means that it was within theology that the defense 
of Latin was modeled and promulgated. Here, Latin was clearly the lan-
guage of the sacred. The dignity of the liturgy required Latin; the eternal 
quality of the sacred could only be reflected in the immutable language of 
Rome. The proper idiom of sanctity was a language that remained pure by 
virtue of being pristine. As the mid-fifteenth-century Lord Chief Justice 
Fortescue put it, the language of law "is oftener writ than spoken" and so 
does not suffer the fate of the vernacular, which is "altered and depraved by 
common use." 18 That it was necessary to express the universal in a dead or 
IS. See Paulus Krueger, dedication to Justinian 's Institutes, trans. Peter Birks and Grant McLeod 
(London, 1987), pp. 32-33. 
16. "Juris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia" (Justinian 's Institutes, §1.1, 
p. 37). 
17. Again, it is Pierre Legendre who has written most extensively about the legal function of 
vi tam instituereor institution oflife. See, most recently, Legendre, Sur la question dogmatique en 
Occident: Aspects theoriques (Paris, 1999), pp. 106----9. In Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History, Law 
(Berkeley, 1996), I trace the metaphor of the law as a nursing father in Early Modern common law 
texts. 
18. Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae (1470; London, 1737), p. 108. 
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at least archaic language was not without perceived irony. The defenders of 
the faith not only linked Latin to the unchanging nature of truth but also 
believed that the pristine or opaque character of Latin to those who wor-
shipped or otherwise appeared before the sacerdotes, the priests or the 
judges, was a virtue or charm of its usage. That most of those who intoned 
the creed or sung orisons in Latin did not know or understand the language 
added to the quality of the ritual and increased the fervor of the devout. 
Worship conducted in a foreign tongue added an air of vagueness and mys-
tery to the service. The verba visibilia of the Sacrament, the signs of the 
divine, were part of a complex encoding of truth and power, just as the 
foreign and archaic language oflaw may have concealed any direct referent 
while vividly displaying the power or maiestasof the interpreter. The solem-
nity and emotional impact of the ceremony was increased by the reliquary 
quality of the language in which it was performed. 
The other face of the defense of Latin, apologia pro lingua sua, was a 
dismissal of the vernacular or local tongue. Again, in quite explicit terms, 
those who attacked Latin in the name of accessibility, equality, or contem-
poraneity were encouraging heresy. The priest, the interpreter, was a being 
apart, different from other men, a solitary figure who enjoyed the ontolog-
ical plenitude of spiritual learning. Those who would try to wrest interpre-
tation away from the priest were directly attacking the sanctity-the 
hieros-that supported both the institutional structure of tradition and the 
truth that it carried. Thus, according to Alfonso de Castro's Adversus omnes 
hereses of 1534, if vernacular translations were allowed "'the established or-
der would end by being overturned, with women becoming doctors'" (L, 
p. 45). 19 More succinctly, according to the Repertorium inquisitorum, a work 
that was central to the Inquisition, "the translation of the books of the Holy 
Scriptures into the vulgar is forbidden."20 The vernacular was viewed as the 
harbinger of the destruction of religion and a symptom of a general move 
towards vandalism, decadence, and disbelief. In the mode of the apology, 
loss of belief was associated with solecism, ignorance, stupidity, and then 
with femininity, antinature, uncleanness, and barbarism.21 
The defense of Latin was political in a structural sense. A monotheistic 
truth is one that is repeated all the way down the hierarchy of social and 
19. The reference to women doctors refers to women taking over from the doctors of theology 
whose responsibility it was to preserve the integrity of the faith . Interestingly, of course, de 
Castro's prediction was accurate. 
20. Repertorium inquisitorum, trans. Louis Sala-Molins under the title Le Dictionnaire des 
inquisiteurs: Valence, 1494 (Paris, 1980), p. 185. 
21. Such is the rhetorical mode of the defense. It is captured well in the figure of antirrhesis, 
which is discussed and elaborated upon in Goodrich, Oedipus Lex, chap. 3. 
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political knowledge from the divine ruler to the lay subject or pauper. Each 
lesser form of subject is a mirror of its exemplar, its model or prototype, 
the divine subject. It should not, therefore, be a surprise that the defense of 
the legal use of Latin took precisely the same form as the theological ar-
gument in favor of the dead universal. Using the example of Early Modern 
common law, the founders of the tradition were explicit advocates of the 
vocabula artis oflaw. Sir Edward Coke, whose major texts were both in Latin 
and the vernacular, was very clear that law Latin, the language of record and 
of the principles and maxims of law, and to a lesser degree law French, the 
Gallic idiom of local customs, were the intrinsic tools of those learned in 
the law, of the iuris peritus, or legally wise. 22 There was no question that law 
should remain in its own special code for reasons that were both structural 
and pragmatic. At a structural level, the language oflaw, the mixed argot of 
law Latin, law French, and Middle English, was a pristine form reflecting a 
law that went back not simply to the Romans, the Venetians, and the Spar-
tans but also to Camelot, to the Druids, to Neptune, and thence to nature 
and God. 23 The foreign quality of legal language reflected an origin in time 
beyond memory and expressed a formal character oflaw that was not only 
artistic but also authorizing in the strongest of senses. 
The argument in favor oflaw Latin was in virtually all respects the same 
as the theological debate. Faith in law required a language that would reflect 
the sanctity and opacity of law. Thomas More, for instance, was adamant 
in his dispute with Christopher Saint German that Latin alone would pre-
serve the tradition of law and the esoteric truths that specialist interpreta-
tion alone could provide. 24 When Saint German argued for the printing of 
law books in the vernacular his argument was not that the language oflaw 
be changed but only that there be accessible representations of law, trans-
lations of statutes, treatises, and institutes so that public awareness of law 
could be promulgated.25 At the level of structure, the argument for trans-
22. See the preface to Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, ed. George Wilson 
(London, 1m). For discussion of the languages oflaw, see David Mellinkoff, The Language of the 
Law (Boston, 1963), and Peter Tiersma, Legal Language ( Chicago, 1999 ). 
23. Coke, Fortescue, Spelman, Selden, and others all offered wildly differing mythical origins 
for common law. These are discussed briefly in Goodrich, "Eating Law: Commons, Common 
Land, Common Law," Law in the Courts of Love, pp. 87-90. 
24. See Thomas More, The Apology, in The Complete Works of Sir Thomas More, ed. J. B. Trapp, 15 
vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1979), 9:131; interestingly, in Utopia, More inverts the argument, referring 
to "laws which either be in number more than be read or else blinder and darker than that any man 
can well understand them" (More, Utopia, trans. Ralph Robynson [1556; Boston, 1999), p. 173). 
25. Christopher Saint German, Salem and Bizance (London, 1533), fol. iv r, argues that Latin 
hides the defects, the "defaults" of the tradition and law in an inaccessible tongue. If the law is for 
the people then there should be an English version of it. It was this argument more than most that 
incited More's The Debellacyon of Salem and Bizance (London, 1533). 
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lation and for printing law books was not an attack upon legal faith. Quite 
the contrary: translation and use of the vernacular would create a second 
and more popular order oflaw, but it would remain nevertheless a second 
tier, a more popular knowledge, a derivative species or shadow of a theo-
cratic order. 
The sages and apologists of common law argued consistently for a dis-
cipline and method that was rooted in the Latin of Azo and Bracton. For 
Coke, there was no question that the vocabula artis of law be retained. It 
was necessary to protect the imperite, or unlearned, from indulging in legal 
practice or lawsuits for themselves and thereby losing their property or 
their fortune. He also believed that the antiquity of common law should 
necessarily rest in the time-honored language of the profession because it 
was an ahistorical truth, one which returned time and again to reform ill-
considered statutory amendments or the merely human interventions of 
unlearned politicians. Again resorting to a Latin principle and idiom-even 
though this work was in the vernacular-Coke observes that in hominis 
vitium non professionis: it is men who err and not the law.26 For Abraham 
Fraunce, etymology was truth ( id est veriloquium), and Latin grammar was 
essential to knowing one's profession.27 Law was a science to be conducted 
more geometrico, in Lambard's usage of a continental axiom, and for later 
defenders of the faith, such as Maitland, the same position held true; the 
language oflaw reflected terms of art that were akin to the Latin of chemists 
or geometers. 28 The Reformation drive to the vernacular, in other words, 
did not impact directly upon common law. At most, it created a problem 
of representation, a need to use vernacular translations on the public mar-
gins of the profession as a way of allaying the more radical criticisms of 
lawyers and the law. In Fulbeck's phrase, the terms of the law were "sileni 
alcibiades," meaning that they were foreign and ugly on the outside but 
contained gems of truth within. 29 
For the apologists of common law, the defense of law Latin and law 
French, of principles, rules, and records that remained exclusively in Latin 
until the end of the seventeenth century, was rooted in a kind of mysticism. 
26. James Osborn 's Case10 Co. Rep. 130. The argument in favor of Latin is given in the preface 
to Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England, or, a Commentarie upon Littleton, 2d 
ed. (London, 1629), fol.Cb a, and the introduction to Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke. 
27. See Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, p. 56v. 
28. See William Lambard, Archeion, or Discourse on the High Courts of Justice in England 
(London, 1635), and F. W. Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance ( Cambridge, 1901). 
29. Fulbeck, Direction or Preparative to the Study of Law, pp. 55-56; see Goodrich, Languages of 
Law (London, 1990 ), where I argue that Fulbeck falls within a much longer tradition of juristic 
occlusion of the political functions oflaw Latin and law French. 
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The language of law was an esoteric code; it was a mystery enshrining the 
arcana imperii and was defended for its theological value as much as for its 
practical use. Everything connected to the language oflaw was sacred, and 
thus, for Coke, to take an example, the records oflaw were kept in thesaurus 
regiae, in the king's treasure chest and later in the sacred library (sacramen-
torum latibula) at Westminster. 30 At a political level, the arguments in favor 
of the retention of the foreign languages or vocabula artis oflaw came much 
closer to promoting codification and latinization of common law than to 
threatening its vernacularization. 31 The point is counterintuitive and some-
what paradoxical and so deserves emphasis. 
The push for the vernacular in the disciplines was a product of print and 
of Ramist as well as Lutheran reforms. England resisted most of this conti-
nental pressure descendre en moderne, and it had a largely superficial effect 
there. It is true, of course, that the proponents of the vernacular praised En-
gland and Englishness as against Rome and the tinctures of Normanism.32 
Promotion of the vernacular was presented as a reassertion of an antique 
Englishness that preceded Rome and the Roman occupation of Britain. 33 
Richard Mulcaster, the author of the The First Part of the Elementary of 1582, 
a treatise on the "right writing of the English tongue," thus argued that 
English was older and better than Latin. 34 There was nothing that could not 
be translated, and many ingenious artistic vocabularies were subsequently 
devised. In philosophy, for example, Ralph Lever produced an English Arte 
of Reason, with a wholly anglicized vocabulary of terms "compounded of 
true and ancient English words."35 Lever's lexicon ofinholders (substance), 
inheers (accidents), endsays (conclusions), storehouses (common places or 
topics), proving terms (invention), and so on was free both of inkhorn or 
foreign terms and of philosophical significance. 36 
As in the Church, so in the polity: the linguistic reformers won the battle 
but lost the war. The Anglican settlement merely passed the power and most 
of the forms of Rome to the English sovereign and Church ofEngland, while 
30. Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England: Concerning High Treason, and 
Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal Causes, 2d ed. (London, 1648 ), fol. L ii a. 
31 . Thomas Starkey, A Dialogue between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset ( 1535; London, 1948) 
is the best example. For a discussion see Goodrich, "Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism, 
and Common Law," Social and Legal Studies. 1 (1992): 7-28. 
32. See Thomas Wilson, The State of England, Anno Domini 1600, ed. F. J. Fisher (1602; London, 
1936), and John Warr, The Corruption and Deficiency of the Lawes of England Soberly Discovered 
(London, 1649). 
33. See John Favour, Antiquitie Triumphing over Noveltie (London, 1619). 
34. See Richard Mulcaster, The First Part of the Elementary (London, 1582). 
35. Ralph Lever, preface to The Arte of Reason, Rightly Termed, Witcraft, Teaching a Perfect Way 
to Argue and Dispute (London, 1573), n .p. 
36. See ibid., and Richard Sherry, A Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (London, 1550 ). 
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the translation of statutes and law books simply added legitimacy to a Gallic 
and so thoroughly Latin law.37 The most significant defense of the English 
Church was John Jewel's Apologia ecclesiae Anglicanae, a Latin apology that 
argued unrepentantly for an English Roman Church and for the continuity 
of this local form of a Latin religion. Thus Jewel states of the new law that 
"we have overthrown no kingdom, we have decayed no man's power or 
right, we have disordered no commonwealth. There continue in their own 
accustomed state and ancient dignity the kings of our country of En-
gland."38 In a similar vein, one of the first English dictionaries, the won-
derfully titled Manipulus vocabulorum, was a rhyming translation of 
"original" Latin words.39 In lexico-grammatical and legal terms, Latin pre-
ceded and acted as the model for the vernacular use. Translation did not 
expunge but rather extended the reach of Latinity. 
The vernacular created a second stratum oflegal language, a more or less 
rich vein of accessibility for those who could read the national idiom. The 
movement towards the national language, however, neither reformed the 
linguistic structure of law nor reversed the hierarchy of legal knowledge. 
The early law dictionaries were part of a project to institutionalize common 
law in explicitly Latin form, and Cowell's Interpreter even takes its subtitle, 
Booke Containing the Signification of Words, from the fiftieth book of the 
Digest, De verborum significatione, a lexicon that was used throughout Eu-
rope both as a title for treatises on interpretation and as a dictionary of 
terms.4° Cowell transcribed an intrinsically Latin institutional structure by 
translating the antique words of the law. As the Ramists were fond of say-
ing-and of course they said it in Latin-the ars artium, the art of arts, and 
scientia scien tiarum, the science of sciences, was the rule of method inherited 
through classical scholasticism. Similarly, though this was not his direct 
meaning, the English civilian Sir Robert Wiseman termed Roman law the 
lex legum, or law oflaws, and Latin was the form it took.41 
Within the civil and ecclesiastical polity of England, the political asser-
37. See Goodrich, "Critical Legal Studies in England: Prospective Histories," Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 12 (Summer 1992): 195-236. 
38. John Jewel, Apologia ecclesiaeAnglicanae, translated under the title Apologie or Answere in 
Defence of the Churche of Englande ( 1562; London, 1564 ), fol. G i b. 
39. See [P. Levins], Manipulus vocabulorum: A Rhyming Dictionary of the English Language 
(London, 1570 ). 
40. See John Cowell, The Interpreter, or Booke Containing the Signification of Words (London, 
1607). 
41 . See Robert Wiseman, The Law of Laws, or the Excellency of the Civil Law above All Humane 
Law Whatsoever(London, 1664). The original edition was in Latin, with the title Lex legum 
(London, 1656). On the Ramistic reform of tlie disciplines, and particularly law, see the 
introduction to Petrus Ramus, The Logike (London, 1574); and, for a discussion, Goodrich, "Ars 
Bablativa: Ramism, Rhetoric, and the Genealogy of English Jurisprudence," in Legal Hermeneutics: 
History, Theory, Practice, ed. Gregory Leyh (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 43-82. 
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tion of the national language never disturbed the order of things, the es-
tablishment of law, or the way things were done. It might be that the 
vernacular allowed a greater degree of dialogue over laws and judgments 
but that novel accessibility was a second order of discourse and neither pen-
etrated nor reversed the onward march of a tradition and hierarchy en-
sconced in antique forms and their sacral terminologies. Latin remained 
the master trope oflaw right up to the twentieth century; the norm was the 
gnome or sentential figure that derived from a virtually seamless tradition 
of law Latin and, at the local level, of the ius commune or common law, the 
miserable terminologies of law French and Middle English. 
Collapsing the Symbolic 
A history as expansive and a politics as pervasive as that of the Latin 
tradition cannot and does not die out; it mutates. It is a history that belongs 
in the long term to structures, and, to borrow a phrase from Foucault, "we 
have not yet cut off the head of the King" in grammar.42 The architectonic 
of the political, the "pre-schematisation" of social thought, is predicated 
upon the language and categories of Roman law. 43 Institution and subjec-
tivity alike are structured around the trinity of persons, actions, and things, 
a Roman law division of categories that we inherit from Gaius through the 
Christian tradition of civil law. It is possible, therefore, to argue that Latin 
survived because it was only the expression of a more fundamental law. The 
longevity of its pedagogy somehow and indirectly signified a deeper or 
unconscious meaning and affect. Borrowing from Nietzsche, I suggested 
earlier that Latin was the symbolic-the long-term structure of social life-
and this suggests that the demise of Latin should be understood not as a 
literal death but rather as denial or negation, as an acknowledgement in the 
form of dismissal, as a negative incorporation. We may continually or ep-
isodically be trying to kill Latin, but it is still very much alive and kicking. 
The usual explanation for the supposed death of Latin is twofold. First, 
at a political level, the rise of nationalism destroyed the universal tongue. It 
was a sectarian or local defeat in which the national idiom and literature 
sponsored an imagined community that was alike free of Latin biases and 
universalist pretentions.44 This thesis, however, neither fits with the history 
42. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York, 
1978), pp. 88-89. Nietzsche, in the Genealogy of Morals, also makes the point that we cannot claim 
to have killed God if we still believe in grammar. 
43. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London, 1965), p. 494, quoted in W. T. Murphy, 
"Memorising Politics of Ancient History," Modern Law Review 50 (1987) : 386. See also Gillian 
Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law ( Oxford, 1984). 
44. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London, 1984). 
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of the continued teaching of Latin long after the advent of vernacular lit-
erature nor does it explain the chasm that has always separated the assertion 
of Latin literacy from its practice. The second explanation is cultural. Ac-
cording to Waquet, the long term demise of Latin was a result of exhaustion. 
It died with a whimper and over several centuries because, as H. G. Wells 
put it, teachers of Latin were like people endlessly fiddling with the keys to 
an empty room. The May 1968 slogan Down with Latin expressed an un-
bridgeable gap between the archaic language and contemporary life. By the 
late twentieth century Latin had become confined to universities and 
schools and that restriction proved fatal: "The exhaustion of which Latin 
died in the 1960s was not exhaustion of the language. Latin disappeared 
because it no longer meant anything to the contemporary world" (L, p. 273). 
This explanation too is unsatisfactory or at least incomplete. Latin never 
meant very much in any direct sense to the bulk of the population, and its 
link to the contemporary, to popular literary genres or everyday speech, was 
always tenuous at best. 
If the demise of Latin refers to the death of Latin speakers and so to the 
demise of a minority dialect or language then its position is ironically not 
that of extinction but rather of absorption. Latin has been incorporated into 
the dominant culture and lives on as a fecund paradigm oflexical and legal 
choices of diction and argument. As far as English is concerned, Latin lives 
in etymology, in lexicon, and in grammar. The position of contemporaries 
is arguably not that different from that of those whom Fraunce dismissed 
as "silly penmen, and illogical lawyers, who think it a fruitless point of su-
perfluous curiosity to understand the words of a man's own profession."45 It 
may be true that legal language no longer depends upon any explicit rec-
ognition of Latin, but there is Latin everywhere in law. The Latin that is 
internal to law, that survives in maxims and words as well as in the deri-
vation of English words, in the rules of grammatical order and reference-
in short in what we now call style-is far from insignificant. In this sense 
Latin lives on; it has a second life as part of the English language and as a 
primary source of the argot of law. Latin, which was historically the almost 
exclusive possession of the ruling class, is now a property of, or more ac-
curately a dialect within, the vernacular. It is no longer exclusively an upper-
class affectation, but it remains an attribute of professional practice and a 
weapon in the rhetorical armory of scholars and lawyers. 
Just as the iconic archaisms of a culture-its architecture, its monu-
ments, its records and other insignia-continue to depend upon Latin to 
inscribe and interpret the culture's forms and occasionally its words, so too 
45. Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, p. 56v. 
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law carries within it the scars or long-term inscriptions of the moribund 
universal. It is here that the careless talk of the exhaustion or death of Latin 
is most paradoxical and least persuasive. Western metaphysics was, is, and 
remains Latin. The question, of course, is what such a striking hypothesis 
actually means. I will suggest that while the supposed death of Latin seems 
to render it less visible, its political effect is to make it ever more effective 
as a rhetorical device. Its scarcity enhances its value and credibility; its eso-
tericism renders it rhetorically powerful. Latin titles, quotations in Latin, 
references to Latinate sources or "originals" sound ever stronger in the con-
temporary public sphere. The archaism of Latin refers to a metaphysics and 
a sense of tradition that have strong effects within the scholastic and pro-
fessional public spheres. It has different effects from those that it had in the 
past, when the literate had to pretend to know Latin, but those effects re-
main powerful and persistent. As the example of the Queen of England re-
sorting to Latin evidences, the symbolic still requires Latin, and Latin gives 
maximum effect. 
The exhaustion of Latin suggests sleep rather than death, and it is in that 
vein that we should try to understand the afterlife of the language in terms 
of the fate of the symbolic. At the level of "the order of things" the demise 
of Latin exposes the symbolic roots of our culture and opens them to criti-
cism and renewal. There is, in other words, a liberatory potential to the 
collapse of the antique idiom that lies principally in the opportunity to as-
sess and reconstruct the conceptual framework of institutions and cultures. 
One could say that the death of Latin brought on the postmodern condition 
or that what was unconscious within public culture can now be made con-
scious, rethought, and either retired or revived. There is, in a sense, a reversal 
of cause and effect insofar as the Latin that used to rµle absolutely as gram-
mar is now disinterred as a substrate of concepts and terms of art that can 
be appraised and either discarded or put to other uses. Latin remains and 
poses for us the question of how we should use those remains. 
The concept of the death of Latin, as Nietzsche suggested, has its roots 
in the death of God. It therefore also suffers the ambivalence and complexity 
of that peculiarly Christian parricide. In metaphysics God lives on not least 
by virtue of the denial of His existence, the Nietzschean claim that we killed 
Him. As Nietzsche also would put it, beware of killing your enemy because 
you thereby immortalize him. Abolishing Latin from the curriculum or 
from what du Marsais called "the ordinary course of studies" does not and 
cannot eradicate Latin or erase its significance to the structural, long-term 
patterns of Western culture. Down with Latin implies laying or throwing 
Latin down, an iconoclasm that creates initially a problem of method. At 
one level, the problem is that we cannot know what it means to kill Latin, 
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to collapse the symbolic, precisely because we do not have the means of 
knowing. Latin is, in this sense, what separates us from the past. The Corpus 
iuris, to borrow a metaphor, is precisely an embodied law, an unconscious 
form, a habit or ethic that the modern legal profession, the remnant of scho-
lasticism within the public sphere, enacts with only the vaguest of notions 
of the categories and principles that make contemporary law possible. 
It is particularly true of common lawyers that an absence of Latin and a 
historical resistance to acknowledging the Latin roots of common law have 
sometimes obscured the meaning of rules. The Ramist reduction of com-
mon law to treatises and institutes in the Early Modern period, from Edward 
Coke to Thomas Wood, was both a scholastic enterprise and a borrowing 
from Roman law. 46 The nineteenth-century developments of the common 
law were almost entirely predicated upon the importation of forgotten Ro-
man law rules.47 The much prized contemporary renaissance of equity is 
nothing other than a return to Latin principles. The equity of restitution, 
for example, is no more than a Roman return within a forgetful Anglican 
law.48 There is also, however, a certain obscurantism to the claim that one 
cannot know the past in translation. Virtually all of the treatises and insti-
tutes, statutes and judgments upon which Roman law is based are available 
in the vernacular. The tradition can be studied and pieced together in its 
modern and local forms. These may depend historically upon Latin, but 
they are now variant and local, vernacular and revised forms of the antique 
language and law. What is needed now is not a revival of Latin but an un-
derstanding of the anthropology and philology of transmission. 
That we disliked Latin-for my generation that meant a dislike of our 
46. Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Lawes of England, is perhaps the least interesting 
example. The tradition of institutes, modelled on Justinian's, begins with John Cowell, The 
Institutes of the Lawes of England, Digested into the Method of the Civil/ or Imperial/ Institutions 
(1605; London, 1651), which originally appeared in Latin and was subsequentytranslated by the 
author. Fulbeck, A Parallele or Conference of the Civil Law, the Canon Law, and the Common Law of 
This Rea/me of England (1601; London, 1618) argues that the latter law cannot be separated let alone 
understood without a knowledge of the former two. Thomas Ridley, A View of the Civille and 
Ecclesiastical Law (Oxford, 1676) argues lengthily for the importance of understanding Roman law 
to anyone who hopes to understand common law. Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of 
England, 2 vols. (London, 1720) went through several editions, and in his Some Thoughts 
Concerning the Study of Laws in England Particularly in the Universities (London, 1727), pp. 8-9, 
Wood is admamant that it is with the imperial law of Rome that any understanding of legal 
forms--of regulae iuri5--begins. 
47. This argument is well made by A. W. B. Simpson, "Innovation in Nineteenth-Century 
Contract Law," Law Quarterly Review91 (1975): 247-78. See also James Gordley, The Philosophical 
Origins of Modern Contract (Oxford, 1991) on the seventeenth-century Latin tendrils of modern 
contract rules. 
48. See Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford, 1985), chap. 1; Birks 
provides a useful account of the civilian roots of quasi contract. 
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Latin teachers and their violent pedagogy-does not mean that we should 
ignore it. That Latin is officially-if erroneously-dead, that we feel in some 
respects murderous and guilty, requires if not a process of mourning at least 
a careful and unhurried coming to terms with what the disappearance of 
Latin from the common curriculum means. I would argue that at best it 
offers an opportunity, an opening onto what has been for some time a scle-
rotic residue within an uncertain tradition. The decay of Latin allows us to 
acknowledge this passing on, this skeleton in the closet oflaw. It makes the 
demise of Latin explicit and so potentially an object of study, of a renewed 
humanism, of a new historicism and translation. It allows us to acknowl-
edge, outside of spurious nationalistic sentiments and willful parochialism, 
that Latin has been and is an important and much ignored register within 
a polyglot and pluralistic tradition of law. Paradoxically the death of Latin 
may in this sense remind common lawyers of the European roots and com-
mon continental tradition, or ius commune, to which Anglo-American stat-
ute and precedent belong as a local variation. 
The moribund contemporary state of Latin may presage a diminution 
and fragmentation of the public sphere. That the public sphere is Latin in 
structure, that lawyers act as if they knew Latin, that the works of scholars 
and critics devolve around translated Latin forms does not suggest demise 
so much as mutation or a changing form. To borrow again from Nietzsche's 
aper~u, those who work with texts need a head for the symbolic and that 
means at one level that they must understand inherited Latin forms. The 
symbol is also, however, a coded reference, a sign with a plenitude of con-
notations. We are probably little less literate in Latin now than during the 
era of its renaissance. The Renaissance was an age of translation, and then 
as now literacy in Latin was an elite preserve. Until recently the teaching of 
Latin was as much about the inscription of a formula as it was about an 
ability to read Latin texts. In other words, Latin still abounds in translation, 
and Latin and Latinate texts fill up the libraries. Latin is simply used dif-
ferently now. It is if anything more esoteric, more arcane, and so also more 
striking and of greater potential for rhetorical effect. The use of Latin is full 
of sound and fury. 
Being Dubious in Bush v. Gore 
Writing at the height of the European Renaissance of the sixteenth cen-
tury, Fran~ois Hatman remarked that his contemporaries' obsessive and 
servile concern with reviving Roman law was both uncritical and largely 
erroneous. Roman law was for him an antique form-tenebras antiquita-
tis--that offered a resource but few answers to contemporary problems. 
Roman law was in the end no more than the law of a particular time and 
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place; far from being a universal rule, it was "a particular prerogative in-
vented to maintain bourgeois Romans in a higher degree of dignity and 
wealth than the other inhabitants ofltaly."49 Hotman argued for a critical 
appreciation or resolute use of Roman law where it could properly add to 
or amend contemporary understanding oflocal rules. Bearing in mind the 
virtually coincident jurisdiction of philology and law during the Renais-
sance, Hotman's argument should be understood as a call for an appreci-
ation of Latin in its historical and cultural context. so Roman law, like any 
law, was a political project and should be understood as such. Criticism 
stands in opposition to reverence; erudition lies in understanding Latin as 
a symbol, as an imperialist language and law that lies at the roots of all the 
Western juristic traditions. We do not need to love Latin, nor do we need 
Latin to understand vernacular laws, but without an appreciation of the 
imperialism and the monotheism that founds the culture of Western law 
we have a slim grasp of and little access to the symbolic functions of the 
legal forms that constitute the institution and the public sphere. 
I have argued that Latin is not dead, it is unconscious-asleep. The ques-
tion that persists is therefore that of coming to terms with the recognition 
of that loss of consciousness, that collapse of the symbolic. Like Nietzsche's 
ambivalent death of God, the collapse of Latin as a living or conscious reg-
ister of national languages has important political consequences. We have 
now to come to terms with the fact that there is no singular grammar, no 
one truth or substrate of tradition and law. Hotman's shadows of antiquity 
are precisely that, shades or ghosts, the continuing forms of the past in the 
present. We can mourn their loss, their death or collapse, the demise of the 
law of laws. That is a specialist undertaking, a species of erudition, though 
one that can certainly be translated into vernacular forms. In this vein, Latin 
represented the myth of a universal culture, the hierarchical dream of an 
absolute and unitary source of a singular structure of law. That myth or 
dream lives on in Western culture, but it is not any longer the only or dom-
inant project. It is the hierarchy and specifically the hieros or sanctity of Latin 
that needs to be unraveled and put to other uses. The collapse of the sym-
bolic allows us moderns to invent new and hybrid forms. 
The rhetorical significance of modernity's indirect access to Latin texts 
and traditions should be viewed neither nostalgically nor as a sign of 
powerlessness. In any proper sense, Latin was always a specialism, and 
philological erudition-pedantry-inhabited a small corner of the public 
49. Frani;:ois Hotman , AntiTribonian ou discours d'un grand et renomme iurisconsulte de nostre 
temps sur l'estude des lo iJc (1567; Paris, 1603), p. 74. 
50. A theme well elaborated in Donald Kelley, Fo undations of Modern Historical Scholarship: 
Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance (New York, 1970 ). 
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sphere. For the various publics that now make up civil and political society, 
Latin is as much as ever a matter of translation, a matter both of there being 
an "origin" to translate or betray and an expression of distance and differ-
ence. Latin may seem more esoteric, the preserve of the Ivy League, but that 
purist sense or at least appearance oflinguistic use was always archaic, elitist, 
and specialized. Latin as a conceptual structure, as grammar and law, has 
been readily accessible in translation for centuries. We do not need to be 
specialists to use Latin, nor should we feel inadequate or inauthentic for 
using it without understanding its declensions or moods. We are free to use 
Latin, and in the contemporary context that means using it as a heavy sig-
nifier-big words. Latin was the symbolic; it is also a symbol, and it should 
be used as such, as a rhetorical effect, as a striking or loud statement in the 
theater of the public sphere. We share our ignorance of Latin, and we should 
put our ignorance to work. We can equally share an appreciation of Latin 
as a rhetorical device, as a form of argument, a reference to the aporia of 
knowledge. We should not, in other words, be shy of Latin but rather should 
use it to be critical, to apprehend and unpack both vehemence and doubt. 
To borrow again from the Manipulus vocabulorum, it is necessary to use 
Latin, to use our handful of surviving Latin words, to be sure, but also to 
manipulate words, to remember both the history and the doubt that attach 
to all arguments and all judgments. 
The paradoxical consequence of acknowledging the demise of Latin tran-
spires to be that of inaugurating a critical use of the idiom and the structure 
of Latinity. Latin is an immense reservoir of cultural and legal possibilities, 
of heavy signifiers and dramatic enactments of argument. These need to be 
appropriated and, specifically, to be taken away from the elite that claims 
an exclusive use of such terms. This does not mean a return to Latin but 
rather a conscious appreciation of the political importance and fragility of 
the work of translation. To gain access to what Latin literature has to offer 
means engaging in the work of reviving and inscribing translations of that 
tradition within our own. It means reversing the hierarchy that used to see 
Latin as the norm or rule. The vernacular and local law are now the context 
within which and from which the relics of a putatively universal law are to 
be appraised and put to use. Within common law, to continue with that 
example, for five centuries Latin has been treated antagonistically as an ink-
horn or hotchpot form. Latin has been reviled and cursed for reasons that 
range from pedagogy to politics. Such hostility gives Latin too much status, 
too much power. It leaves it obscure or untranslated. Such an approach is 
disempowering and politically naive, as can be illustrated vividly by looking 
to contemporary case law. 
What then, to take a final instance, is the meaning of the Latin phrase 
214 Peter Goodrich I Distrust Quotations in Latin 
used recently and egregiously by the Supreme Court? In Bush v. Gore, the 
majority of a divided Court handed down a judgment prefaced by two Latin 
words: "per curiam."5 1 The technical legal meaning of per curiam refers to 
decisions handed down unanimously on procedural issues or on "demur-
rers," a law French term that refers to preliminary points oflaw. The Latin 
term in Bush v. Gore does not have either of these connotations; the case 
was neither argued nor decided as a procedural issue, and more to the point, 
it was far from a unanimous determination. The rhetorical significance of 
the use of Latin, the framing of the decision as per curiam lay precisely in 
Latin as a sign, and any critical account of Bush v. Gore would do well to 
begin by translating that sign. 
The usual translation of per curiam is "by the court" though it equally 
means "through the court." The latter meaning conveys more of the force 
of the legal use of the term. Historically the term curia referred to the space 
or place of law. It was the suite or following of the king whose law an 
itinerant judiciary would dispense as delegates of both God and the 
Crown-in the formal and of course Latin designation, the judge was de-
legatus maiestatis.52 In this derivation per curiam meant in essence that a 
common law judge's decision was imbued with the sanctity and authority 
of the divine source of the law. The law spoke through the judge. The Latin 
term, in other words, implied a Latin metaphysics. It invoked and, as an 
archaic usage, as a Latin term of art it still invokes the mystical source of 
law, the corpus mysticum of the constitution.53 
It seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court, in labeling its decision 
per curiam, was self-consciously manipulating the etymological meaning of 
the term. The Court's use of a foreign language nonetheless and somewhat 
ironically participated in that earlier meaning. In a decision that was bound 
to face immediate and intensive public scrutiny, the Court used a dead lan-
guage to summon the majesty and mystery oflaw to their aid. Their use of 
Latin was an explicit attempt to obscure the human sources and the political 
meanings of the judgment. It is not even necessary to address the other 
possible meanings or plays upon the word curius, which include "full of 
sorrow," to appreciate that the Court's use of the Latin was at best dubious, 
and being dubious is likely the purpose and certainly the effect of such a 
51 . See Bush v. Gore. 
52. On the history of the king's curia, see Lambard, Archeion, p. 148. On the role of the judge as 
delegate, see, for example, Cowell, The Interpreter or Booke Containing the Signification of Words 
(Cambridge, 1607), though Fortescue, De laudibus, is an earlier and fuller source. 
53. On the history of the corpus mysticum of state within the common law tradition, the 
exemplary study is still Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval 
Political Theology (Princeton, N.J., 1957). 
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use of Latin in a vernacular age. The Court used Latin as lawyers have used 
Latin for hundreds of years, namely, to obscure, solemnize, and sanctify 
what would otherwise appear to be an all too human and much too political 
process. 
The contemporary function of Latin is rhetorical. It acts as a sign, a figure 
or trope, the conduit of extremity of emotion. It indicates a charge or con-
densation around the subject or judgment being delivered. The Supreme 
Court's use of Latin fits that rhetorical definition. The Latin mode of ex-
pression was a persuasive device, an attempt to use a figure of speech that 
would allay the fears or satisfy the desires of its auditors. The appellation 
per curiam was technically a catachresis, the figure that in classical rhetoric 
depicts the incorrect use of a term, and most specifically an archaism or 
foreign term that is manipulated for persuasive effect. 54 Latin has its uses, 
but such uses should not be allowed to obscure the political nature oflegal 
judgment or the hierarchy that is secreted in the archaism of juristic rules 
and procedures. Latin, including the decision to use or cite Latin, needs to 
be translated and critically examined. Latin is not of itself the bearer of a 
threat; it is no longer a mode of pedagogic punishment nor even necessarily 
the menacing sign of class superiority or domination. It can and in some 
contexts does, however, still have those functions, but only to the extent 
that the reader or audience allows. The availability of translation and indeed 
the inauthenticity of most legal and political uses of Latin, as with that in 
Bush v. Gore, mean that this sound and fury can be challenged, contested, 
and exposed. The use of the term per curiam in Bush v. Gore was the legal 
equivalent of thinking that du Marsais's Des Tropes referred to a tribe. 
Whereas the latter example may raise a smile, an equivalent blunder on the 
part of the Supreme Court evokes tears rather than laughter. 
54. Du Marsais, Des Tropes, pp. 33-44, interestingly treats catachresis as the primary trope: 
erroneous use is the primary form of invention. For a lawyer's definition of the term, see George 
Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (1589; London, 1869), p. 191, where catachresis is defined as 
abuse. I am suggesting that the use and misuse of the term per curiam was a double abuse, first in 
the simple resort to Latin to hide the process of determination-its ambiguity or division-and 
second in that the term has an artistic meaning that is here misrecognised or avoided. For a 
different (apologetic) view of the usage, see Arthur J. Jacobson, "Ghostwriters," in The Longest 
Night: Polemics and Perspectives on Election 2000, ed. Jacobson and Michel Rosenfeld (Berkeley, 
2002) . 
